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AN ACT FOR ALL CONTEXTS: INCORPORATING
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT INTO
TITLE IX TO HELP PREGNANT STUDENTS GAIN
AND RETAIN ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Kendra Fershee*
Few would agree that pregnancy discrimination is a tolerable byproduct of a modern society. Yet there is at least one segment of society
where pregnancy discrimination can thrive-federallyfunded schools.
Even though Title IX was passed in 1972 to bar discrimination in
schools based on sex, it is quite possible for schools to discriminate
based on pregnancy with little impunity. Worse, those who suffer the
discrimination cannot sue for the harms they suffered in federal court,
nor can they seek monetary redress, even if they were financially harmed
by the discrimination.
The status of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, coupled with the
inadequacy of Title IX makes it difficult for pregnantstudents to protect
themselves from pregnancy discrimination or discourage schools from
engaging in the practice.A proactive approach to stemming pregnancy
discrimination is crucial for pregnant students, just as it was for
working women when Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act in 1978. Congress should make ending pregnancy discriminationin
schools a clearly defined goal that is efficient and effective by passing an
amendment to Title IX that expressly includes pregnancy discrimination
in its prohibition of discriminationbased on sex. This Article discusses
how Supreme Court precedent has coalesced to allow pregnancy
discrimination in schools to slip through the cracks in Title IX and
arguesfor an amendment similar to the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct
in Title VII to rectify the problem.

* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., Tulane
Law School; B.A., University of Michigan. Many thanks to my husband, who also serves as my
most trusted editor and faculty colleague, Josh Fershee, and to our children, Holden and Tessa, for
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress, in an uncharacteristically efficient process,
passed a somewhat curt provision to amend Title VII to make clear to
employers that pregnancy discrimination at work is unlawful.' Dubbed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it overruled General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert2 -U.S. Supreme Court precedent which held that an employer's
insurance plan that excluded pregnancy from short-term disability
coverage was not discrimination "on the basis of sex." 3 The Supreme
Court's decision in Gilbert was not the first of its kind. Only two years
before, the Court decided that sex discrimination barred by the Equal
Protection Clause did not bar discrimination based on pregnancy. These
auspicious cases created a backdrop, in a time that was ripe with
political discourse about women's rights, which made it possible for
Congress to quickly reverse the Court's ruling in Gilbert and clearly
indicate that Title VII does protect women from pregnancy
discrimination in the workplace. Apparently satisfied that women were
now protected, the forces behind the pro-Pregnancy Discrimination Act
political furor quieted and moved onto other pressing women's issues.
Unfortunately, the job of protecting women from pregnancy
discrimination is not done. An entire segment of society is still at risk for
pregnancy discrimination and the individuals affected by it have no
personal remedy when it happens. What is worse is that these individuals
are the least likely able to protect themselves from discrimination and
are the most likely to suffer as a result of it. Despite the provisions
banning discrimination in schools on the basis of sex in Title IX,5 and
the Title IX regulations ("Regulations") specifically prohibiting

1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex'
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions....").
2. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
3. See id. at 144-46.
4. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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pregnant students remain largely
pregnancy discrimination,
unprotected. These students are left to fall into a gap created by a series
of Supreme Court cases that make it extremely difficult to argue that
students can sue for discrimination in federal court, leaving them with
inadequate remedies to redress the harms they might suffer.
While it is possible for schools that have discriminated against
pregnant students to lose federal funding if they do not cease
discriminating, the disincentives are limited.7 Moreover, students who
suffer discrimination are left with remedies that do not make them
whole. The societal ills that accompany teen pregnancy (high drop out,
unemployment, and welfare rates), which, as an aside, are frequently
cited to stop teens from engaging in risky sexual behavior, can be
attributed in part to a lack of access to education for pregnant and
parenting teens. 9 Unfortunately, a lack of access to education is not
always a choice by a pregnant or parenting student; some schools still
engage in discriminatory practices that force students out altogether, or
into inferior alternative schools.'o Congress must proactively seek to
stamp out pregnancy discrimination in schools by amending Title IX to
include a Pregnancy Discrimination Act of its own.
Part II of this Article discusses the Supreme Court precedent that
makes a private right of action for monetary damages for pregnancy
discrimination next to impossible under Title IX. Part III argues that
Title IX should be amended with a version of the Title VII Pregnancy
Discrimination Act to fill the gap created by the Supreme Court into
which pregnant students fall. Part IV suggests specific recommended
language for the amendment.
II.

THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION GAP IN TITLE IX AND LESSONS
LEARNED FROM TITLE VII

Discrimination against women based on their pregnancy status in
America is not new." The notion that it is improper for a woman to be
visible in society while pregnant was pervasive until relatively
6. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra p. 287-88.
8. See infra p. 287-88.
9. See infra p. 287-88.
10. See, e.g., Cecilia G. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., No. CV 04-7275, slip op.
at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2005); Kicklighter v. Evans Cnty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 715-16
(S.D. Ga. 1997); Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027, 1028, 1030 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
11.

See generally DEBRAN ROWLAND, THE BOUNDARIES OF HER BODY: THE TROUBLING

HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2004). Biological differences between women and
men have been used by men in power to justify a patriarchal society that excludes women based on
many factors, including pregnancy. See id. at XXIV.
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recently. 12 The men who were the public figures of the birth of America,
on the whole, believed that women's usefulness lay in their role as
mothers, but not much more, and that the legal system should reflect that
perception. The combination of these beliefs, that pregnancy was a
fragile condition and that women should be pregnant as much as
possible, created a ripe environment to withhold rights and privileges
from women during their pregnancies. Women were generally confined
to the home when their pregnancies became obvious, essentially
imprisoned "for their own good."l 4
The notion of imprisoning people, either literally or figuratively, to
protect them from some undefined, perceived threat has been an
effective tool in justifying discriminatory treatment in many contexts. A
common theme of the propaganda issued by the United States while
rounding up people of Japanese ancestry, U.S. citizens included, to send
them to internment camps during World War II, was that it was
necessary to protect them (from what was never really articulated).' 5
Racial segregation in American prisons is a common practice, which is
justified as necessary for the protection of the prisoners.16 But it is hard
to imagine a more long-lasting commitment to societal segregation to
guard against perceived danger than the stalwart belief that pregnant
women would suffer great harm if not protected from others, not to
mention themselves.' 7
It is only in very recent history, within the last sixty years, in fact,
that society has begun to realize the injustice of segregating people for
their own protection.' 8 In the span of less than one lifetime, the United
States has made segregation based on race unlawful,' 9 and has
acknowledged the egregious error that was the Japanese internment
camps. 2 0 Thus, in the last forty years, society has begun to acknowledge
that negative assumptions of women's abilities during pregnancy are
unfounded, harmful, and serve to segregate them from crucial segments

12.
13.
14.
15.
(2002).

Id. at 157-58.
Id at 5, 15.
See id. at 13-15, 49-50, 209.
See WENDY NG, JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II, at 13-14

16. See CHAD R. TRULSON & JAMES W. MARQUART,
DESEGREGATION OF THE TEXAS PRISON SYSTEM 70 (2009).

FIRST AVAILABLE

CELL:

17. See ROWLAND, supranote 11, at 208-10.
18. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
19. See id at 495.
20. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2006) (acknowledging "the fundamental injustice of the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry during World War II").
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of most people's lives, such as work. 2 1 Pregnancy discrimination in the
employment context was specifically prohibited by Congress through the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978.22 Despite Congress's recognition
that pregnancy cannot be a reason to withhold rights and responsibilities
from women in employment, Congress has not yet acknowledged
directly that schools must also not discriminate based on pregnancy.
There are two pieces to the legal puzzle that help courts determine
whether pregnancy discrimination has happened in an educational
context. When an allegation of sex discrimination is made against a
school, courts look to, among other places, Title IX for guidance on how
to adjudicate that claim.2 3 The language of Title IX, however, is very
broad and does not include any mention of pregnancy in its mandate to
treat the sexes equally in school. 24 For more specific guidance, courts
can look to the Regulations, which do instruct schools about the
parameters of how schools should treat pregnant students. 2 5 The
problem for pregnant students who have suffered pregnancy
discrimination is that statutory protection is always more comprehensive
and beneficial than regulatory protection, and they are falling into a gap
that makes filing a claim so unattractive and unlikely to succeed that it is
nearly a legal fiction.26
A. Title IX Regulations Offer Limited Protectionto PregnantStudents
Who Experience PregnancyDiscrimination
Title IX was passed by Congress in 1972 to ban discrimination
27
based on sex in educational settings. Its language is simple: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ....28 So simple, in fact, that many
questions about exactly what behavior Congress intended to ban and
what sort of protection Congress intended to provide arose almost
immediately after its passage.2 9 In 1975, the confusion led the U.S.
21. See ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 157, 159, 161-62, 164.
22. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
23. See 20 U.S.C. § 1683.
24. See id. § 1681(a).
25. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1, 106.40 (2010).
26. See Robert D'Augustine, A Loosely Laced Buskin? The Department of Education'sPolicy
Interpretationfor Applying Title IX to IntercollegiateAthletics, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 469, 484
(1996).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
28. Id.
29.

See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
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Commission on Civil Rights to criticize the Department of Education
("DOE"), then called Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for
taking more than two years to enact regulations to implement Title IX. 3 0
The Regulations finally became effective on July 21, 1975.31
The Regulations cleared up some of the confusion about what Title
IX actually was intended to outlaw, by barring discrimination based on
sex in several specific contexts.32 The most important provisions, for the
purposes of this Article, are the sections of the Regulations that bar
discrimination against students based on marital status or pregnancy.33
Specifically, the Regulations prohibit schools from excluding students
from school or school programs for being pregnant, from forcing
pregnant students to attend alternative programs for pregnant or
parenting students, and from providing alternative programs to pregnant
or parenting students that are not equivalent to the mainstream programs
available to all students. 34 The Regulations also incorporate the Title VI
procedural provisions, which require, among other things: (1) selfreporting by schools to provide information about whether they are in
compliance with the law and, (2) the DOE to conduct compliance
reviews and investigations of complaints.
Even with their specificity regarding pregnancy discrimination, the
Regulations need revisions.36 They are inadequate to reach their internal
goals with respect to pregnancy discrimination in schools, in that they
cannot guarantee pregnant students access to education, preserve their
choice to stay in a mainstream school, or ensure that alternative
programs are equivalent in quality to mainstream schools.3 ' The lack of
data collection requirements, enforcement provisions that fail to account
for the fleeting nature of pregnancy, and silence about how school
administrators should discuss a pregnant student's educational options
without bias are only a few of the failures of the Regulations.38
EFFORT-1974: VOLUME 3: To ENSURE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
availableat http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED102071.pdf.

OPPORTUNITY 39-41 (1975),

30. See id at 41.
31. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2010).
32. See id. §§ 106.21-61 (prohibiting sex discrimination by schools in admissions,
recruitment, housing, financial assistance, athletics, and more).
33. See id. § 106.40.
34.

See id

35. See id. §§ 100.6(b), 100.7(c).
36. See generally Kendra Fershee, Hollow Promises for Pregnant Students: How the
Regulations Governing Title IX Fail to Prevent Pregnancy Discrimination in School, 43 IND. L.
REv. 79 (2009) (arguing that the Regulations cannot reverse entrenched policies of expulsion and/or
temporary exclusion of pregnant students without major revisions).
37. See id. at 89, 111-12.
38. See id at 94-115.
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Tightening and improving the Regulations would primarily help protect
schools from violating the law in the first place, but would not do much
to make a pregnant student who has suffered discrimination whole.
Ultimately, even perfect Regulations cannot fully redress the harms
pregnant students suffer in the face of discrimination and cannot be the
only legal authority that stands between discriminating school districts
and the pregnant students in their schools. For these reasons, Title IX
must be amended to include language similar to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in Title VII.
1. Under Current Supreme Court Precedent, Title IX Does Not
Clearly Permit a Private Right of Action for Violations of
Discrimination Barred in the Regulations
As noted above, the language of Title IX does not include the word
"pregnant," or any derivation thereof. 39 The Supreme Court has grappled
with, in many contexts, what rights and benefits lie for litigants who sue
for discrimination that is barred in regulations to a statute, but not in the
statute itself. The Court's decisions regarding whether Title IX permits
recovery of monetary damages from schools that discriminate based on
sex do not address whether pregnant students could recover monetary
damages for pregnancy discrimination.40 The Supreme Court has never
ruled that the Regulations permit compensatory damages for pregnant
students. 41 A line of cases decided by the Court, starting in the 1970s,
suggest that while Title IX itself does permit a private right of action and
compensatory damages for violations of the statute, a damages award for
violations of the Regulations is not among the remedies a plaintiff can
seek. The first in this line of cases was the Court's decision in Cannon v.
University of Chicago.4 2
In Cannon, the Court was faced with determining whether a woman
who applied to, and was rejected from, a medical school could bring a
private right of action under Title IX for discrimination based on sex.4 3
The Court analyzed whether Title IX provided her the opportunity to
seek specific performance, or if her only recourse was to request that the
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
40. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that an action brought
under the regulations to Title VI does not allow a private right of action); Franklin v. Gwinnett
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that Title IX (the statute, not the Regulations) does
allow plaintiffs to sue for monetary compensation); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717
(1979) (deciding that Title IX (the statute, not the Regulations) does have an implied private right of
action).
41. See Fershee,supra note 36, at 106 n.187.
42. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
43. Id. at 680.
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DOE cut off federal funding to the University.44 Because Title IX does
not specifically state, on its face, that specific performance is an
available remedy to plaintiffs, the Court needed to determine whether a
private right of action was implied by the meaning of the statute.45 The
Court looked to four factors, applied in a case that it had recently
decided, to determine if it would be appropriate for a court to order that
the University admit the plaintiff to the medical school.46 The four
factors developed in Cort v. Ash 47 helped the Court in Cannon decide
that an implied right of action existed in Title IX. 48
First, the Cannon Court considered a threshold question developed
in Cort that requires a court seeking to determine whether a statute
contains an implied private right of action to ask whether the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a class of people in which the plaintiff is a
member.4 9 So, in the Title IX context, because the plaintiff in Cannon
was a woman who was claiming that she was denied admission to
medical school because she was a woman, she fell squarely into the
category of people Title IX was intended to protect and satisfied the
threshold question raised in Cort.50 The next step in determining
whether a statute contains a private right of action is to look to the
legislative history to see whether Congress clearly intended to deny a
private right of action in the statute." The Cannon Court referenced
several sources to make this determination, but principally compared
Title IX to its sister statute, Title VI, to see if Congress contemplated a
private right of action when it wrote Title IX. 5 2 The Court dug a bit into
the history of Title IX and Title VI to rule that Congress clearly intended
Title IX to include a private right of action. 5 3
Only six words separate Title IX and Title VI. 54 Where Title VI
bars discrimination based on "race, color, or national origin[,]" Title IX
substitutes the word "sex." 55 The Cannon Court noted this slight
difference in the statutes when determining whether Congress intended
to allow a private right of action in Title IX, because the Court had

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 704-06.
See id. at 683, 688.
Id. at 688-89.
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-89 & n.9 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 680, 693-94.
Id at 694.
Id. at 694-98.
Id. at 694-703.
Id at 694-95.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

290

[Vol. 39:281

already determined that Title VI carries an implied private right of action
when Congress passed Title IX. 56 Operating under the presumption that
lawmakers know the current law when passing new law, the Court
decided that Congress intended the same implied private right of action
in Title IX as that which exists in Title VI.s?
Moving on to the third consideration to determine whether an
implied private right of action exists in Title IX, the Cannon Court
followed the Cort decision that a private right of action should not be
read into a statute if doing so "would frustrate the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme."5 Again turning to Title VI, the Court looked to
the objectives of Title IX and Title VI.59 The Court reviewed what it
considered to be related, but ultimately different, objectives in the
statutes. 60 The first objective was to avoid funneling federal funds to
schools that discriminated unlawfully, and the second was to provide
individuals protection against discriminatory practices. 61 The Court
reasoned that it would be more efficient, orderly, sensible, and consistent
with the intent of the statute for courts to allow litigants to receive what
they had initially been denied by the discriminatory practice (in Cannon,
admittance to medical school), rather than require the DOE to rescind
federal funding to the offending school.62
The Court quickly dispensed with the final Cort consideration,
which prohibits federal courts from implying a private right of action if
it would be inappropriate to do so because the subject matter of the
statute is mostly of concern to the States.63 Stating that no problem is
raised in this context by barring sex discrimination, the Court skipped
the next step of weighing the four factors because they all supported the
same outcome. 4 With that, the Court ruled that Title IX contains an
implied private right of action.
Obviously, a determination that Title IX itself does contain a
private right of action does not mean that the Regulations also do.
Because administrative regulations are borne of a separate constitutional
power from the legislative function, they do not contain the same force

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 696-98.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id; id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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and effect that the statutes they are meant to implement do.66 This
concept formed part of the Court's reasoning in Alexander v.
Sandoval,67 when it decided that the regulations to Title VI did not carry
with them an implied private right of action.68 In Sandoval, the Court
considered whether the regulations to Title VI contained a private right
of action for an individual person, not an agency, to file a disparate
impact discrimination case against the Alabama Department of Public
Safety. 6 9 Before reaching the question of whether the regulations
themselves could contain a sort of self-executing private right of action,
the Court looked to the language of Title VI to see if it had an implied
private right of action to enforce the regulations.7 0
For help in deciding whether the language of Title VI creates an
implied right of action to enforce the regulations, the Court looked to
Cannon, which determined that the statutory language of Title IX
contains an implied private right of action.7 1 The Sandoval Court
pointed out that the operative language in Title IX and the language in
section 601 of Title VI, which are nearly identical, clearly show that
Congress intended to create a private right of action for individuals to
enforce those sections of the statutes. 72 At issue in Sandoval, however,
was the language contained in section 602 of Title VI, which reads, in
pertinent part: "Each Federal department and agency which is
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program . .. is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of . .. this
The Court looked
title ... by issuing rules [or] regulations . . ..

closely at the language of section 602 to conclude that Congress did not
include "rights-creating" language that conferred a private right of action
74
to individuals to enforce the regulations to Title VI.
The Sandoval Court also considered an argument raised by the
government and respondents, which suggested that the regulations
themselves contained "rights-creating" language that permits individuals
to bring a private right of action when the regulations to Title VI have
been violated. Rejecting this reasoning, the Court stated:

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
532 U.S. 275.
Id. at 291, 293.
See id. at 278.
See id. at 288-91.
See id. at 279-80, 282 & n.2, 288-90; supranote 54 and accompanying text.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-80.
42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (2006); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288.
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-9 1.
Id. at 291.
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Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right
that Congress has not. Thus, when a statute has provided a general
authorization for private enforcement of regulations, it may perhaps be
correct that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine
whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is most certainly
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private
cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. A encies
may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.
The most crucial consideration in the Court's decision in Sandoval,
in the context of trying to determine whether the regulations to Title VI
can be enforced through a private right of action, however, hinges on
whether the regulations "authoritatively construe" the statute itself,
which the Court reasoned can only happen when the regulations bar
*
intentional
discrimination. 77
In Sandoval, the Court was asked to consider whether a person can
bring a cause of action to enforce regulations to Title VI, which forbid
agencies from using uniform criteria that result in discrimination on the
basis of color, race, or national origin, commonly known as disparate
impact discrimination.7 8 Relying on Cannon, the Sandoval Court stated
that the Cannon decision only permitted a private right of action for
intentional discrimination barred by the text of Title IX and not
unintentional discrimination. 7 9 The Sandoval majority's interpretation of
Cannon led it to decide that the disparate impact regulation, which bars
unintentional discrimination, could only be supported by a private right
of action if the text of Title VI permitted it.80 As stated above, the Court
held that section 602 of Title VI did not permit such an action.8 1 Even
though the Court held that section 602 did not create a private right of
action to enforce violations of the regulatory bar on unintentional
discrimination, it did discuss the clear intent of section 601 of Title VI to
confer a private right of action for intentional discrimination barred in
the regulations. 8 2

76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See id. at 284-85.
78. See id. at 278.
79. Id. at 282. The dissent in Sandoval took extreme umbrage at the notion that the Cannon
Court only permitted a private right of action for intentional discrimination, stating that the Cannon
Court ruled that an implied right of action exists for not just "some of the prohibited [Title IX]
discrimination, but all of it." Id. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 286 (majority opinion).
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284.
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The Sandoval Court attempted to put fears to rest that its decision to
block a private right of action for the disparate impact regulations would
also bar a private right of action for violations of the Title VI regulations
barring intentional discrimination.83 The Court stated that it did "not
doubt that regulations applying" the ban on intentional discrimination in
the statutory text are enforceable by the direct, private right of action
permitted in the section.84 The regulations that bar intentional
discrimination, reasoned the Court, "authoritatively construe" the statute
and are enforceable through the language of the statute itself.85 The
Court then listed several other Supreme Court cases where the Court
ruled that regulatory provisions in other federal statutes carried with
them a private right of action, and suggested that those provisions were
all meant to bar intentional discrimination. 86 Based on this reasoning,
knowing whether the pregnancy Regulations would be enforceable
hinges on whether the Court would consider them to authoritatively
construe the text of Title IX itself.
It seems, based on the Court's decision in Sandoval, that
determining whether regulatory provisions can be enforced through a
private right of action is a three step process. First, a court must analyze
the text of the statute at issue and rule that it authorizes private
enforcement of the statute, which the Court in Cannon ruled Title IX
does, when someone suffers discrimination "on the basis of sex." 87 If the
statute authorizes individuals to bring an action to enforce any of the
provisions of the statute or the regulations thereto, the analysis would
stop there. But, as is true for Title IX (and Title VI), when the statute is
silent regarding the private enforceability of the regulations, a court must
move on to the next step.
Second, a court must determine what kind of discrimination the
regulation bars that a plaintiff is seeking to enforce. As stated above, the
Court decided in Sandoval that the text of Title VI only authorizes a
private right of action for regulations that bar intentional
discrimination.88 The Court relied heavily on Cannon, which construed
Title IX, stating that the Cannon decision only allows a private right of
action to redress intentional discrimination under Title IX (even though,
as stated in the dissent to Sandoval, the Cannon Court never expressly
ruled that only intentional discrimination would be subject to a private
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 284-85.
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 693-94 (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 74, 80-81.
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right of action). So the Supreme Court is likely to rule that Title IX,
like Title VI, only authorizes a private right of action to enforce
intentional acts of discrimination that are barred in the statute or the
Regulations. A court would next have to review the regulation at issue to
determine what kind of discrimination it bars.
Third, a court would have to decide if the regulation at issue in the
case bars intentional or unintentional discrimination. The Supreme Court
has ruled, in various cases over the years, that certain federal regulations
carry a private right of action, a list of which Justice Scalia in Sandoval
includes as cases he says involved regulations that barred intentional
discrimination. 90 Unfortunately, those cases have been decided on their
facts and offer little guidance about what regulations the Court might
review in the future would be considered to target intentional
discrimination and which might target unintentional discrimination. This
uncertainty makes it hard to predict if the pregnancy Regulations might
be considered aimed at intentional or unintentional discrimination.
So, in order to determine whether a private right of action arises in
the Title IX Regulations, a court must find that they "authoritatively
construe" the text of the statute, which requires a court to take two
steps. 91 First, a court must determine that the text of Title IX
contemplates pregnancy discrimination as discrimination "because of
sex." 92 Second, if a court agrees with the Sandoval Court's
understanding of Cannon, that a private right of action is only available
for intentional discrimination, it must then determine whether the
pregnancy Regulations bar intentional discrimination. Both of these
considerations make it, at best, unclear if the Regulations contain a
private right of action, and at worst, likely that they do not.9 3

89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
90. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284-85. Those cases included rulings that regulations defining what
a "recipient" is under Title IX, defining "physical impairment" and "major life activities" under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and interpreting Title VI to require recipients to use
affirmative action to remedy past intentional discrimination, all carried with them a private right of
action. Id.
91. See supra notes 80, 88-89 and accompanying text.
92. See infra Part I.B for a longer discussion analyzing the Supreme Court's precedent on
whether pregnancy discrimination is defined as discrimination "because of sex."
93. But see David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
217, 275 (2005). Professor Cohen argues that Title IX creates more substantive equality rights than
does the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Regulations were enacted pursuant to protecting
those rights, so the pregnancy provisions in the Regulations should be interpreted as "authoritative
interpretations of the statute." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Unfortunately, it is not at all
clear that the federal courts, or even a federal court, would come to the same conclusion Professor
Cohen did, leaving the question of whether pregnant students can sue for pregnancy discrimination
dangerously unresolved.
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2. The Elusive Private Right of Action Would Not Necessarily
Provide Monetary Damages for Plaintiffs
After the Cannon Court determined that the text of Title IX does
allow a plaintiff to bring a private right of action, the Court expanded the
reach and power of Title IX one step further in Franklin v. Gwinnet
County Public Schools,9 4 when it awarded compensatory damages to a
plaintiff who sued a school district for intentional sex discrimination.9 5
In Franklin, the plaintiff brought an action against her school district for
allowing a high school coach and teacher to sexually abuse her
(including three occasions when he signed her out of class and coerced
her into engaging in sexual intercourse). 96 The Court analyzed whether
the implied right of action in Title IX afforded redress through monetary
damages for intentional violations of Title IX, and ruled that it did. 97
The Court relied on two legal principles to rule as it did, based on
longstanding precedent and more recent legislative action." While
careful not to conflate the separate legal considerations, a legal right to
bring an action as an individual seeking redress under a statute, and the
legal right to recover money for a violation, the Court decided that
intentional violations of Title IX do permit plaintiffs to recover damages
for the harm they suffered. 99
The Court grounded in two legal principles its determination to
allow successful plaintiffs suing under Title IX to recover damages for
intentional discrimination. 100 The first principle was based on
longstanding precedent permitting courts broad discretion to redress
legal rights that have been protected by federal law. 10 The Supreme
Court has relied on this concept since Marbury v. Madison,102 where
Justice Marshall relied on Blackstone's principles of remedies to justify
his determination that the high esteem the judiciary enjoyed would cease
"if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right." 03 The Court restated the concept in more modern times in a 1946
case, stating, "[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

503 U.S. 60 (1992).
See id. at 63-64, 76.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 62-63, 76.
Id. at 67-72.
Id. at 65-66, 76.
See id. at 66-73.
Id. at 66-68 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

HOFS7RA LAW
WREV1EW

296

[Vol. 39:281

courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."1 04
In addition to the broad remedial power vested in the federal courts, the
Court in Franklin also relied on a legislative mandate from Congress in
1986 to support its determination that damages are available under Title
IX for intentional discrimination. 105
The Franklin Court looked beyond the common law for support
that Congress intended Title IX to permit claimants to receive monetary
damages for intentional discrimination. 10 6 After the Supreme Court
decided that plaintiffs are entitled to bring a private right of action under
Title IX in Cannon, Congress passed two amendments to Title IX that
led the Franklin Court to "conclude that Congress did not intend to limit
the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX."' 0 7 The first
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment protection from lawsuits for
actions against a state for Title IX discrimination.'" The next allowed
claimants to seek the same remedies from a state defendant as they
might have received from any other public or private entity.1 09 The
combination of the two legislative acts gave the Franklin Court
assurance that Congress intended to apply the traditional common law
rule of providing a broad list of remedies to those whose federal rights
have been violated. 110

The Court was later confronted with a case similar to Franklin, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,"' when a student
sued a school district under Title IX for damages for sexual harassment
after it was discovered that she was having a sexual relationship with a
teacher.1" 2 The Court was able to distinguish Gebser from Franklinand
affirmed the lower court's decision not to award damages. 113 The most
significant difference between the two cases was that the plaintiffs in
Gebser attempted to recover against the school district for the teacher's
actions via respondeat superior.11 4 A crucial subsidiary consideration to
the respondeat superior claim in Gebser was that the student did not
report the sexual relationship, causing the Court to determine that the
defendant school district did not have notice of the harassment and could

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id (alteration in original) (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
Id. at 72-73.
See id
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
See id. at 277-78.
See id. at 279-80.
See id at 282-83.
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not be held liable for the teacher's actions.115 The plaintiffs attempted to
rely on the availability of respondeat superior liability in the Title VII
employment context to make the argument that Title IX should be read
similarly, but the Court rejected that argument.11 6 The Court laid out
reasoning for that rejection, which can be instructive when trying to
predict what courts might do when asked to decide whether the
Regulations contain a private right of action for compensatory damages.
First, the Gebser Court reasoned that Title VII contains specific
statutory provisions to allow a private right of action, and provide
plaintiffs with compensatory and/or punitive damages to redress
violations of the statute." 7 The damages provision, according to the
Gebser Court, clearly defines the availability of and limitations to the
scope of damages recoverable under Title VII."' Title IX, on the other
hand, has no express private right of action and, the Gebser Court stated,
the judicially implied private right of action in Title IX cannot indicate
what the legislative intent regarding damages would have been." 9
According to the Court, the lack of an express legislative language in
Title IX regarding damages awards leaves unclear when damages should
be awarded at all for Title IX violations.120 This silence was interpreted
by the Court as granting it flexibility to create remedies that comport
with the statute.121
The Court then looked to the text of the statute to try to determine
the scope of the potential remedies that flow from it, considering its
statutory structure and purpose. 122 The Court stated that an implied
remedial scheme cannot "'frustrate the purposes"' of the statute. 12 The
Court concluded that it would frustrate the purposes of Title IX to allow
damages to be recovered from a defendant employer that did not have
actual notice of the discrimination.1 24 Reasoning that, because Congress
did not create a private right of action under Title IX, the text of the
statute does not "shed light" on what remedies under an implied right of
action would be appropriate, the Court looked to the amendment to Title
VII allowing compensatory and punitive damages for guidance.12 5 The

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id at 278, 282-83.
See id. at 283.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 283-84.
See id at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 285.
Id.
See id. at 285-86.
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express limits imposed upon the amount of recovery in the Title VII
amendment permitting monetary recovery implied to the Court that the
silence in Title IX regarding damages could not support the notion that
"unlimited recovery" would be appropriate to redress Title IX
violations. 126
Second, the Gebser Court emphasized the dissimilarity between the
framework of Title IX and the framework of Title VII to infer a
reticence on the part of Congress to allow monetary damages awards for
Title IX discrimination in some circumstances. 127 The Gebser Court
relied on its description of the Title VI framework from GuardiansAss'n
v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 128 which it
characterized as a "contractual" relationship between recipients of
federal funds and the government and contrasted it with the prohibitory
nature of Title VII.12 9 Title IX conditions the receipt and retention of
federal funding by educational institutions on compliance with the
statute, whereas Title VII prohibits all employers, regardless of whether
they receive federal funding, from discriminating. 13 0 The Court in
Gebser was concerned about holding employers liable for the
discriminatory acts of an employee when the employer did not know of
the discrimination, because the contractual nature of Title IX was meant
to protect individuals from discrimination, not compensate them for it, as
is the aim of Title VII. 13 ' The relationship of the Government and the
recipient of federal funds under Title IX seems to be a pivotal concern in
the Court's analysis in deciding who can recover for Title IX
discrimination, not the individual who experienced the discrimination.1 3 2
Setting aside the concern that the Sandoval decision precludes
federal courts from hearing pregnancy discrimination cases brought
under the Regulations by individuals, the Court's decisions in Franklin
and Gebser paint a grim picture for the possibility that successful
claimants could be awarded compensatory damages. Although the
Franklin Court does not limit compensatory damages to cases involving
intentional discrimination in its holding, the decision distinguishes an
earlier decision that limited remedies for unintentional discrimination.133
In Franklin, the Court reasoned that the Pennhurst State School &

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 286-87.
463 U.S. 582 (1983).
Gebser, 524 U.S at 286.
Id. at 286-87.
Id at 287-88.
Id at 288-90.
See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
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Hospital v. Haldermanl3 4 decision stood for the proposition that statutes
passed pursuant to the Spending Clause in the Constitution could not be
the source of compensatory damages in lawsuits alleging unintentional
discrimination. 135 The Franklin Court's reliance on the distinction
between unintentional and intentional discrimination when deciding
whether compensatory damages are available to claimants suing for
discrimination under Title IX further indicates the uncertainty of
monetary remedies for violations of the Regulations. The Court further
limited the possibility of compensatory damages under Title IX in
Gebser, using reasoning that further indicates a probable reluctance by
the Court to extend a compensatory damage remedy to the Regulations.
The Court's decision in Gebser relies on reasoning that makes it
more difficult for a future court to decide that compensatory damages
are recoverable for a violation of the Regulations. First, much of the
Court's analysis in deciding that compensatory damages were not
available was grounded in the fact that Title IX has no express private
right of action and is silent on damages.1 3 6 This concern, despite the fact
that the Court had already found an implied private right of action under
Title IX and permitted damages for intentional discrimination under the
Act, shows a hesitation on the Court's part to extend those holdings to
the Regulations as well. Second, the Court's reliance on the idea that
Title IX is contractual in nature creates precedent that encourages courts
interpreting the Regulations to focus not on the individuals who have
been wronged but the parties to the contract: recipients of federal
funding and the Government. Both of these conditions, limiting the
possibility of receiving monetary damages for Title IX discrimination,
could also be used to justify a court's refusal to extend monetary
damages to the Regulations.
The Supreme Court has examined Title IX from a multitude of
angles since it was passed in 1972. After each decision, even in those
where the Court has expanded the anti-discrimination reach of Title IX,
hope that a cause of action for individuals seeking monetary damages for
pregnancy discrimination in schools has dimmed. The Court's reticence
to effectively redress pregnancy discrimination is not new. The history
of the Court's decisions regarding pregnancy discrimination, in a
constitutional and Title VII context, can be instructive here. The bleak
picture of the Court's precedent, painted by the cases discussed above
regarding the likelihood that the Court will determine the Regulations

134. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
135. See Franklin,503 U.S. at 74.
136. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84.
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afford a private right to sue for money, which interpret Title IX and Title
VI, gets even bleaker when considering how the Court has handled
pregnancy discrimination in the past.
B. Is PregnancyDiscrimination"On the Basis of Sex" Under Title IX?
The Supreme Court has built a precedential framework that makes
it virtually impossible for a court to determine that a litigant who has
suffered pregnancy discrimination in school has a right to bring an
action against the school for monetary damages. To recap, in order to
hear such a case, a court must first determine that the Regulations
barring pregnancy discrimination in schools "authoritatively construe"
the text of Title IX itself.13 7 In order to authoritatively construe the text
of the statute, the Regulations must ban discrimination that is barred by
the text of the statute.138 In other words, any discrimination by a school
against pregnant students, which is barred by the Regulations, must have
been "on the basis of' their sex, not just because of their pregnancy
status. Second, the plaintiff would have to prove that the discrimination
was intentional. 139 Once both of those hurdles were cleared, a court
would then move on to consider whether damages were appropriate,
which has its own challenges, as stated in Part II.A.2, supra.
The first roadblock set up by the Court for Title IX litigants seeking
redress for pregnancy discrimination from a school that has
discriminated is the determination of whether pregnancy discrimination
is "on the basis of sex." Longstanding and controversial Supreme Court
precedent makes it entirely possible, even likely, that courts faced with
this question would determine that the Title IX pregnancy Regulations
do not prohibit discrimination "on the basis of sex." The Court's take on
whether pregnancy discrimination is "because of' sex has been
illuminated in three cases. The first, Geduldig v. Aiello,14 0 was in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause, where the Court held that
pregnancy could be excluded from benefits provided under a state
disability plan. 14 1 In the next case, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,14 2 a
Title VII case, the Court ruled that excluding pregnancy from an
employer's disability plan was not "because of' sex. 143 More recently, in

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
See id at 486, 497.
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
See id. at136.
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Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,'" the Supreme
Court discussed issues of gender stereotyping, particularly regarding
ideas of women's and men's roles within the family structure and
society, in the context of whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").1 45
The Court's first ruling on whether pregnancy can be the basis for a
discrimination claim came in the form of an equal protection case.146
1. The Equal Protection Clause
In Geduldig, the first of two controversial Supreme Court decisions
regarding pregnancy discrimination, the Court was asked to decide
whether an exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage provided by
the State of California violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.14 7 A pregnant woman who had paid into the
benefit system was denied coverage when she applied for benefits for
the time she was unable to work as a result of her normal pregnancy and
childbirth. 148 After discussing at some length the expense of the
disability program to the State of California and the cost of removing
pregnancy from the list of exclusions, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause was not violated by the State when it excluded
pregnancy from coverage.14 9 The Court stated that it did not agree that
excluding pregnancy from disability coverage amounted to invidious
discrimination barred by the Equal Protection Clause. 5 0 The Equal
Protection Clause bars sex discrimination, so the Court had to separate
sex from pregnancy in order to reach its conclusion, which it did, stating:
"The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities." 5'
The distinction the Court used to determine that the policy did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause was between pregnant women and
non-pregnant persons, not women and men.1 52 The Court stated: "There
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."' 53 By
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

538 U.S. 721 (2003).
See id. at 727-35.
See Geduldig,417 U.S. at 486-87.
Id.
Id. at 489-92.
Id at 493-97.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 496 n.20.
Id
Id. at 496-97.
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identifying the reason for the exclusion as pregnancy and not sex, the
Court was able to apply a rational basis standard analysis to the policy
and determined that the State's reasons for excluding pregnancy, to keep
costs down, were legitimate. 154 The Court responded to the dissent's
concern that the decision permitted sex discrimination by stating that,
absent a showing that the pregnancy exclusion was mere pretext for
discriminating against women, "lawmakers are constitutionally free to
include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis."15 5
After Geduldig, it appeared that future courts analyzing the Equal
Protection implications of policies that address pregnancy concentrated
not on who is being excluded (pregnant women), but what is being
excluded (pregnancy). This distinction is extremely crucial when
looking at whether pregnancy discrimination can be defined as "on the
basis of sex" under the Equal Protection Clause for two reasons. First, if
pregnancy discrimination does not automatically equal sex
discrimination that is barred by the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff
trying to seek redress for pregnancy discrimination must prove that the
motivation for the discrimination was actually the fact that she is female,
not that she is pregnant. Second, it appears that any policy targeted at
pregnancy, as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose,
would be upheld. Obviously, absent a specific federal law barring state
actors from basing employment, educational, or housing decisions on
pregnancy, those actors could find rational reasons to exclude pregnant
women from any number of contexts.
2. Title VII
The Supreme Court has relied heavily on comparisons between
Title IX and Title VI to decide close statutory interpretation calls since
Title IX was enacted, but Title VII can also serve a similar purpose for
Title IX in a different context. Title VII bans discrimination against
individuals in several employment areas, including hiring, firing, and
promotions "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."l56 The text of Title VII includes a private right of action
for violations of the prohibitions in the statute.' 5 7 The text of the statute
was amended in 1991 to allow for plaintiffs to receive compensatory and
punitive damages to redress intentional discrimination by employers. 58
154. Id. at 496.
155. Id. at 496 n.20.

156. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
157. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
158. See id. § 1981a(a)-(b).
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If not for Congress's intervention after the Supreme Court decided
Gilbert, however, Title VII would not have afforded a private right of
action for compensatory or punitive damages to women who suffered
pregnancy discrimination at work.
Two years after the Court decided that pregnancy discrimination
was not barred by the Equal Protection Clause, the Court was asked to
decide a similar case brought under Title VII.'s 9 In Gilbert, the Court
was asked to consider whether a disability policy provided to employees
of General Electric, which, like California's policy in Geduldig,
excluded from coverage disabilities arising from pregnancy, violated
Title VII. 160 The district and appellate courts held, like most lower
courts post-Geduldig,16 1 that Title VII barred employers from
discriminating based on pregnancy, and the Supreme Court disagreed. 162
Because, the Court reasoned, recovery under Title VII, like the Equal
Protection Clause, requires a court to make a finding of sex-based
discrimination, the Court stated that excluding pregnancy from a
disability plan was not "gender-based discrimination at all."l 6 3 The
Court overturned the lower courts, holding that the failure of the
disability plan to cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate
Title VII.164
Applying essentially the same reasoning the Geduldig Court did in
the Equal Protection context, the Gilbert Court stated that pregnancy
discrimination was not discrimination "because of' sex, as was barred
by Title VII.' 6 ' The Gilbert Court, stating that pregnancy discrimination
could serve as a pretext for discrimination based on sex, then went on to
say that there was no such showing.' 66 The Court stated that there was
no gender-based discriminatory effect to the policy excluding pregnancy
from coverage, because, among other reasons, the disability plan is not
worth more to men than women.167 The Court simply categorized the
exclusion of pregnancy as the exclusion of one risk among many they

159. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976).
160. Id.
161. Most lower courts, after Geduldig, construed Title VII to bar pregnancy discrimination,
thus allowing litigants to recover for pregnancy discrimination in the workplace. See Nicholas
Pedriana, Discrimination By Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct of1978, 21 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8-11 (2009).
162. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128.
163. Id. at 136.
164. Id at 145-46.
165. Id at 134-36.
166. See id. at 136.
167. Id. at 138.
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could have excluded from coverage, which did not result in any
discrimination aimed at one sex over the other.16 8
The last analysis the Gilbert Court conducted to determine if the
pregnancy exclusion violated Title VII was to review the regulations
promulgated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
which explicitly required employers to count pregnancy as any other
disability for the purposes of insurance coverage or sick leave.1 69 The
Court noted that the regulations to Title VII deserved consideration in its
analysis, but declined to give them any weight for a few reasons. 7 0 The
Court expressed reservations about how much weight should be given to
the regulations requiring employers to treat pregnancy the same as any
other disability, because they were not implemented until eight years
after Title VII was passed.' 7 ' In fact, the Court noted, the regulations at
issue contravened the regulations about how to treat pregnancy when
considering disability at the time Title VII was passed.17 2 Most
importantly, though, the Court relied heavily on the fact that Congress
did not expressly mandate the implementation of the regulations in the
text of Title VII to determine that they should receive no deference from
the Court when interpreting the meaning of Title VII. 7 1
Congress immediately set to work after the Gilbert decision was
released to overturn it through legislation.17 4 The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act made clear that Title VII bans pregnancy
discrimination in the workplace. 7 s While the Gilbert opinion cannot
stand in the way of women seeking to redress pregnancy discrimination
in the workplace any more, it is instructive when trying to determine
whether Title IX bars pregnancy discrimination. First, it shows that
federal statutes that bar discrimination based on sex must explicitly
prohibit pregnancy discrimination to provide women a cause of action
for negative treatment based on their pregnancy status. Next, it shows
that regulatory schemes attendant to federal statutes that are not
explicitly called for in the text of the statute receive little consideration
or deference from the Court when it is asked to determine what the
statute was intended to prohibit.
The Court's decision in Gilbert appeared to have closed any debate
about whether pregnancy discrimination would be defined as
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 139-40.
Id.at140-41.
Id.at 141-42.
Id. at 142.
Id.
See id at 141.
See infra Part I.C.

175. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
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discrimination.176 After the Pregnancy Discrimination Act superseded
the holding in Gilbert, it is clear that Gilbert cannot be relied upon to
justify pregnancy discrimination in the Title VII employment context
any longer. But the fact that Gilbert was decided at all, especially in the
wake of the Court's holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not
bar pregnancy discrimination in Geduldig, indicates that any federal
statute or constitutional provision that bars sex discrimination will not be
interpreted to bar pregnancy discrimination. After Gilbert, the simple
language of Title IX, barring discrimination "on the basis of sex," could
almost certainly not be held to prohibit pregnancy discrimination, thus
precluding a private right of action under Sandoval.'n Fortunately, in the
context of Title VII, Congress was willing to step in and undo the harm
wrought by the Gilbert opinion's exclusion of pregnancy discrimination
from the protections of Title VII by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. 178
C.

Congress Responds to the Court's Decision in Gilbert with the
PregnancyDiscriminationAct

The hue and cry after the Gilbert decision was immediate and
furious.' 79 Congress acted quickly and introduced the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act as an amendment to Title VII within four months of
the announcement of the Gilbert decision. 8s The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act is straightforward:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes ... .18
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act applied directly to Gilbert and
Title VII, giving women a direct cause of action to sue for pregnancy
discrimination. Its coverage has helped protect pregnant women from
discrimination in the employment context, which is likely where most

176. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 78-93.

178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
179. See Pedriana,supra note 161, at 11.
180. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978).

181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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women suffer pregnancy discrimination, but another crucial societal
context remains unprotected-education.
D. Almost Twenty Years Later,Is There Causefor Hope that the Court
Will Resolve this Issue Favorably?
Although Geduldig remains as a barrier, in certain contexts, to
plaintiffs who have been treated differently because of their pregnancy
status,182 it is possible that a court could hold that Title IX does afford a
private right of action for pregnancy discrimination. The first theory is
based on the idea that the Court, in 2003, laid out a scenario that would
allow some plaintiffs to rely upon the Geduldig carve-out that
acknowledges that pregnancy discrimination can be a pretext for sex
discrimination, if the pregnancy discrimination is based on sex
stereotypes. 8 3 The second theory is based on a textual, jurisprudential,
and theoretical comparison of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,
which points out their differences and allows for the possibility that Title
IX affords more protection than the Equal Protection Clause. 184 While
there is hope that courts could get there, ultimately, the safest path to
barring pregnancy discrimination in schools is via an amendment to Title
IX similar to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
1. The Court's Decision in Hibbs
More recently, in Hibbs, the Supreme Court discussed issues of
gender stereotyping, particularly regarding ideas of women's and men's
roles within the family structure and society in the context of whether
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated the FMLA. 85
The Court held that an employee of the State of Nevada was entitled to
money damages when the State failed to comply with the family-care
provision of the FMLA after he requested leave to care for his ailing
wife.186 The Court granted certiorari in the case in order to settle a
circuit split regarding whether the FMLA permitted litigants to win
monetary damages.' 87 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute because it found that the FMLA was passed pursuant to
182. See Shannon E. Liss, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Discrimination: The Lingering
Effects of Geduldig and Suggestions for Forcing Its Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
59, 94-103 (1997).
183. See Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1891-94 (2006).
184. See Cohen, supra note 93, at 275.
185. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-37 (2003).
186. Id. at 725.
187. Id.
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88
Congress's power granted in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The ruling is helpful to try and understand whether the Court might hold
in the future that Title IX allows a private right of action for pregnancy
discrimination, because in Hibbs, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed how
the Court views "gender-based discrimination."' 89
In order for a federal statute to be constitutional pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be remedial. 190 In order to
uphold the constitutionality of the FMLA, the Court needed to determine
that constitutionally impermissible discriminatory conduct, based on
assumptions of persons' abilities based on sex, was enough of a problem
in the states that the federal government needed to step in and mandate
compliance with the Constitution.191 To show that the FMLA was
indeed necessary to stem discrimination based on sex in the states, Chief
Justice Rehnquist undertook a somewhat detailed analysis of gender
stereotypes and how they have shaped the legal landscape for women
and men in the employment context for years.19 2 Many laws were based
on the premise that women were "the center of [the] home" and in need
of protection from the vagaries of the working world.193 The Court
reasoned that the FMLA was necessary to remedy such discriminatory
decision making and upheld it as a proportional and congruent response
to the discrimination. 194
The Hibbs decision, with its emphasis on the dangers of gender
stereotyping in the workplace and somewhat surprising author (Chief
Justice Rehnquist), gave an indication to some that the Court's position
on pregnancy discrimination may be changing.' 9 5 In the decision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist pays special attention to the differences between
maternity and paternity leave policies that were considered by Congress
when contemplating the FMLA. 196 There are sex stereotypes at the core
of common employment policies, for example, that allow women
significantly more leave after childbirth than men, which, if
unconstitutional, could be remedied through legislation such as the
FMLA.' 97 While this may seem incongruent with the Court's decision in
Geduldig, which allowed pregnancy to be excluded from an insurance

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 726-27, 735.
See id. at 728-31.
See id at 727-28, 734.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729-33.
Id at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 734-35, 740.
See Siegel, supranote 183, at 1891-92.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730.
See id at 731.
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policy because the exclusion was not based on sex, at least one
commentator has pointed out that Geduldig left open the possibility that
some pregnancy-based classifications are based on sex.' 98 Those
classifications could serve as the basis for equal protection claims, and
as is suggested by the language of Hibbs, would provide evidence that
legislation banning pregnancy discrimination is necessary and
constitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.199
What does this all mean with regard to the Regulations and whether
a private right of action exists for pregnancy discrimination? As was
previously stated, Sandoval requires that claimants seeking to enforce
regulations in a private action must show that the regulation upon which
they rely "authoritatively construes" the text of the statute itself.200 That
requires two steps: First, the regulation must clearly fall within the
meaning of the statute's language that gives rise to a private right of
action to enforce that regulation.2 0 1 Second, the discrimination at issue
202
For the purposes of determining whether
must have been intentional.
the Court's reasoning in Hibbs (which gives hope that federal courts
may allow a plaintiff to bring a private right of action for pregnancy
discrimiiation) 203 will have an effect on future courts, the first step is the
most important.
The Cannon Court determined that an implied private right of
action is supported by Title IX for discrimination that is barred by the
language of the statute itself.2 04 The language of Title IX simply bars
federally funded institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex.205
As stated above, a close reading of Geduldig does leave the door open to
an argument that some policies negatively singling out pregnancy may
be considered discrimination on the basis of sex.206 Based on the Hibbs
Court's reasoning regarding sex stereotypes that allow for shorter
paternity than maternity leave policies as unconstitutional discrimination
that warrant a federal remedy, it is possible that a plaintiff could prove to
a court that pregnancy discrimination by a school was based on sex

198. See Siegel, supra note 183, at 1891. The Court in Geduldig states that if pregnancy
discrimination is merely a pretext for sex discrimination, it is barred by the Equal Protection Clause.
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
199. See Siegel, supranote 183, at 1892-94.
200. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 85, 87 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying note 88.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 195-99.
204. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
205. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (2006).
206. See Siegel, supra note 183, at 1891.
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stereotypes and is therefore "on the basis of sex."207 And, according to
Sandoval and Cannon, if pregnancy discrimination is "on the basis of
sex," a plaintiff can pursue a private right of action against a school
under Title IX and its Regulations.
It is certainly possible that a court, after a careful reading of Hibbs
and Geduldig together, might come to the conclusion that negative
treatment of pregnant women based on sex stereotypes is equivalent to
sex discrimination and therefore barred by the Equal Protection Clause.
It is also possible that a court could then apply that reading to Sandoval
and Cannon to determine that a student can sue her school for pregnancy
discrimination. It is also possible, however, that a defendant school
could argue that its exclusion of a pregnant student was not because of
her sex, but because of the limitations her pregnancy puts on her in an
educational environment. As long as the school manages to avoid sex
stereotypes when making the argument, it would fall squarely within the
Geduldig loophole and require a court to deny a private right of action to
the plaintiff. The somewhat unusual and unorthodox nature of pregnancy
in school could give schools a way of justifying discriminatory treatment
of a student-a forced transfer to a pregnancy school, for example-as
necessary to accommodate her physical needs during pregnancy and not
based on sex stereotypes.
2. Title IX Could Afford More Protection than the Equal
Protection Clause, Ameliorating the Possibility that Geduldig
Will Rise Again
There is a second alternative that might allow a private right of
action under the Regulations to plaintiffs seeking redress for pregnancy
discrimination in schools. Under Geduldig, which, as stated in Part
II.B.1, supra, is a case determining that pregnancy discrimination does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, unless the exclusions of
pregnant women are mere a pretext for sex discrimination, they are
permitted.208 If the Title IX language, barring discrimination "on the
basis of sex" is read to be identical to the Equal Protection Clause, then
it, too, would permit pregnancy discrimination. 20 9 But if a court were to
construe the protections in Title IX as different, and more broad, than the
Equal Protection Clause, it is possible that the pregnancy discrimination
210
Regulations could be enforced through a private right of action. In his
article detailing the differences between Title IX and the Equal
207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 1892-93.
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
See Cohen, supra note 93, at 219.
See id. at 275.
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Protection Clause, Professor David S. Cohen relies on the different
textual, jurisprudential, and theoretical underpinnings of the two laws to
argue that Title IX affords more rights to pregnant students than does the
Equal Protection Clause.211
Professor Cohen examines three contexts in which differences
between Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause can be distinguished
from one another.2 12 The differences in the text of the two laws, the
jurisprudence flowing from them, and the theories under which they
were created and interpreted are different in many ways, leading
Professor Cohen to conclude that Title IX offers more protection from
sex discrimination than the Equal Protection Clause in several
contexts.21213 In the realms of disparate impact discrimination, retaliation,
sovereign immunity, and others, Professor Cohen argues that Title IX is
stronger and superior for plaintiffs who sue for sex discrimination.214 It
is in the context of pregnancy discrimination, however, where Professor
Cohen makes, for the purposes of this Article, his most compelling
argument. And while his conclusion that pregnancy discrimination is
barred by Title IX and that it provides a private right of action is a
welcome one to those pushing for more protections for pregnant
students, unfortunately, there is no guarantee that most, if any, courts
will agree with Professor Cohen's conclusion.
3. Three Illustrative Federal Cases Regarding Pregnancy
Discrimination
Before some of the cases Professors Reva B. Siegel and Cohen
relied upon in their analyses were decided, three federal district courts
considered, in three separate cases, whether a plaintiff could seek redress
for alleged discrimination based on pregnancy.2 15 Since the passage of
Title IX, there have been fewer than fifteen reported cases where a
federal court has heard a claim of pregnancy discrimination under Title
IX, and fewer than five where a student brought an action for pregnancy
discrimination against her school.216 Three of those cases are particularly
illustrative of how courts have decided a pregnancy discrimination

211. See id at 240.
212. Seeid
213. See id at275.
214. See id at 276-82.
215. See Cecilia G. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., No. CV 04-7275, slip op. at 2
(C.D. Cal. July 27, 2005); Kicklighter v. Evans Cnty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 715-16 (S.D. Ga.
1997); Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027, 1028, 1030 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
216. See Michelle Gough, Parenting and Pregnant Students: An Evaluation of the
Implementation ofthe "Other" Title IX, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 211, 220-47 (2011).
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issue.217 This dearth of case law could imply that pregnancy
discrimination is not happening in federally funded schools, or, as is
more likely, it could mean that when it happens, bringing a case is
simply not a possible or desirable remedy.
Looking more closely at three post-Title IX cases brought against
schools for pregnancy discrimination could illuminate the challenges
facing students who allege that they have been expelled for being
pregnant. The challenges in these cases illustrate the need for a
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title IX. In the first case,
Hall v. Lee College, Inc.,218 a pregnant student, Ms. Hall, sued her
federally funded college after she was suspended for a semester for
engaging in premarital sex, which violated school policy.2 1 9 The school
admitted that it discovered that she had engaged in premarital sex when
her pregnancy became visible, but the court ruled that the suspension did
not violate Title IX because her suspension was not based on sex. 22 0
Instead, the court stated that because the policy barring premarital sex
was gender-neutral, there was no violation of Title IX.221
Ultimately, Hall was not a case that adjudicated a pregnancy
discrimination claim under Title IX. The court did consider the
Regulations barring pregnancy discrimination, but determined that the
school's policy prohibiting premarital sex was the nexus of the
complaint, sidestepping the pregnancy discrimination issue.222 It is
unclear from the text of the decision if the court converted the case from
a claim of pregnancy discrimination under the Regulations to a claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX, or if the plaintiff
worded her complaint to avoid the pregnancy issue altogether.
Technically, based on the discussion set out in Parts II.D. 1 & 2, supra, a
court would have had to engage in some complex analysis to allow the
plaintiff to bring a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination under
the Regulations, and likely would have concluded that she could not
bring such an action. By considering only whether the policy prohibiting
premarital sex was a violation of Title IX, the court avoided the thorny
issue of whether Title IX also bars pregnancy discrimination.
While not explicitly stating so, the court in Hall implied that
bringing an action for pregnancy discrimination under Title IX is either

217. See Cecilia G., No. CV 04-7275, slip op. at 2; Kicklighter, 968 F. Supp. at 714-16; Hall,
932 F. Supp. at 1028-30.
218. 932 F. Supp. 1027.
219. Id. at 1028-30.
220. See id. at 1030, 1032-33.
221. See id. at 1031-33.
222. See id. at 1032-33.
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impossible or, at best, very difficult, to win. Only a year later, in 1997,
another federal district court heard Kicklighter v. Evans County School
District,223 which centered on a claim of pregnancy discrimination
against a school.224 In Kicklighter, the plaintiff did not make a Title IX
claim, focusing instead on Section 1983, the First Amendment, and the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 25 Ms. Kicklighter alleged that she had been suspended
from school because she had been impregnated by a young man of a
different race and not, as the school stated, because she refused to
apologize to a teacher for disrupting class.226 The facts of the case
indicate that the court was far more concerned with Ms. Kicklighter's
behavior than the potential pregnancy discrimination in which the school
engaged.
The court included in its rendition of the undisputed facts two
comments by school administrators, where they suggested that the
plaintiff attend an alternative school for "'chronically disruptive"'
students because of her pregnancy status.22 7 The court ignored those
facts and focused on a disciplinary issue that arose after the school's first
attempt to encourage the plaintiff to attend the alternative school to grant
summary judgment to the defendants and hold that there was no
constitutional or Section 1983 violation.228 When considering whether
the school had violated her right to Equal Protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court quoted the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit and stated that "'the first step in an equal protection
case is determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was
treated differently than those who were similarly situated to her."' 229 The
Kicklighter Court found that:
Failing to direct this Court's attention to any factual support for such a

finding, Kicklighter cannot surmount the primary hurdle. Because she
has neglected to show, for instance, that Defendants treated her
differently than other pregnant students who misbehaved and then
refused to accept full responsibility for their actions, or differently than
other pregnant students carrying "mixed-race fetuses," Plaintiff is
unable to withstand summary judgment. 230

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
See id. at 715-16.
Id.
See id.at 714, 720.
Id. at 714-15 & n.1.
See id at 720.
Id. (quoting Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court's narrow construction of who is similarly situated
essentially makes it impossible that a pregnant student could win a claim
for pregnancy discrimination, unless there were other pregnant students
in the school who also had discipline problems and/or were impregnated
by a person of a different race and were not treated the same way.
In the most recent case, Cecilia G. v. Antelope Valley Union High
School District,23 1 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California denied summary judgment to the school district, which was
sued by a group of students who alleged that they were involuntarily sent
to an inferior alternative high school program for pregnant students after
they revealed their pregnancies. 2 32 The court did do a fairly thorough
and reasoned analysis of Supreme Court precedent on point, including
Cannon, Gebser, Franklin, and, in a footnote, Sandoval.233 The court's
analysis determined that Title IX does contain a private right of action
for monetary damages, based on Cannon, Gebser, and Franklin.2 34 The
court also flagged, however, a serious problem for the plaintiffs as a
result of the prohibition in Sandoval on actions that are not based on
regulations that authoritatively construe Title IX. 23 5 The court, noting
that neither party mentioned this "significant threshold issue" in their
motions for and against summary judgment, stated that this is "no small
issue." 236
Even though the Cecilia G. Court went on to deny the school
district's motion for summary judgment, the footnote makes it clear that
it should include an argument highlighting that "threshold issue" in
future motions.237 The case settled privately, but the concern that the
plaintiffs would have been barred from pursuing the matter further likely
had an effect on the parties' settlement negotiations. The order seems to
confirm that federal judges might have difficulty determining that a
federal private right of action for pregnancy discrimination exists under
Title IX. The case shows that while the legal theory that supports the
idea that Title IX affords protection to pregnant students may be correct,
the reality for litigants seeking pregnancy discrimination remuneration
after the Supreme Court's decisions regarding Title VI and Title IX is
bleak.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

No. CV 04-7275 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
See id at 2-3 (order denying summary judgment to defendants).
See id. at 10-12 & n.9.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 12 n.9.
Id.
See id at 12 n.9, 30-3 1.
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Both Hall and Kicklighter highlight the practical realities of trying
to bring an action for pregnancy discrimination against a federally
funded school under the current legal scheme. They are old enough that
they are not particularly instructive when trying to predict what federal
courts, especially the Supreme Court, might do if confronted with a
school pregnancy discrimination case today. But they do illustrate how
few school pregnancy discrimination cases are successfully making it
into federal court. And they also show how difficult it can be to win a
pregnancy discrimination case in federal court under the current legal
scheme, even when the court is aware of evidence that the school did
attempt to violate the Regulations. These cases make clear that leaving it
to federal judges to determine whether a private right of action to sue for
monetary damages for pregnancy discrimination under Title IX exists
would leave many potential plaintiffs without a remedy.
In order to avoid the risk that courts will not agree with the analyses
of Professors Siegel and Cohen and allow plaintiffs who have
experienced pregnancy discrimination in schools to sue for damages, it
is time that Congress revisit its lust for justice in the face of pregnancy
discrimination and amend Title IX to include a Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. The cues from the Court have strongly indicated
that: (1) it does not automatically equate pregnancy discrimination with
sex discrimination, and (2) it does not automatically perceive the same
rights as flowing from regulations that flow from statutes. And while it
is possible, with careful reading and an understanding of the complex
history of Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence, for a court to decide
that Title IX does indeed contemplate a private right of action for
damages, there are too many drawbacks to relying on that hope to evoke
meaningful and positive changes for individuals suffering pregnancy
discrimination in schools. The more efficient, effective, and safe
approach would be to add language similar to that which Congress
added to Title VII after the Gilbert decision to Title IX. This proactive
approach would be a far superior path to education equality in the face
of potential pregnancy discrimination in schools and would help stem
some of the social ills that accompany teen pregnancy.
III. IN ORDER TO AVOID RELIVING GILBERT, CONGRESS SHOULD
AMEND TITLE IX TO INCLUDE A PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
While it is unclear if the courts could or would determine that Title
IX bars pregnancy discrimination, most people would agree that
guaranteeing pregnant students access to a quality education is important
to help them successfully transition into independent living. The debate
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is not over whether schools should be allowed to discriminate, rather
how discrimination, when it happens, should be negatively reinforced.
The current scheme it seems, based on court precedent, only permits
administrative action to cut funding to offending schools, and does not
allow more direct action by those who suffer the discrimination. As a
result, pregnant students who are kicked out of school, shuttled off to an
alternative school against their wishes, or who end up in an alternative
school that is inferior to their mainstream school, do not have any
personal incentive to sue for those harms. Without willing litigants to
send up the signal flare that discrimination is happening in a particular
school, it is extremely difficult to root and snuff out pregnancy
discrimination in schools.
A. Where Is the Hue and Cryfor EducationAccess for Pregnant
Students?
It may seem strange that Congress has not yet felt the need, or been
encouraged, to look into whether Title IX should be amended with a
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, nearly thirty years after its first foray into
the issue. Women have been protected from pregnancy discrimination in
employment since the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 2 3 8 But, even
though it has been the norm for girls to attend school for at least as long
as it has been the norm for women to work outside the home, there is
still no clear protection against pregnancy discrimination in schools. The
unique nature of the issue of early pregnancy has been the topic of much
debate, consternation, and frustration in society for many years. 2 3 9
Despite this concern, access to education is rarely, if ever, the driving
force behind solving the problem. Instead the debate is firmly centered
on the same idea-prevention.
It is difficult to quantify the time, energy, and effort that has gone
into the issue of teen pregnancy prevention. Congress and the states have
appropriated millions of dollars, started countless initiatives, and
commissioned numerous studies to try and stop teen pregnancy. 240 The
powers that be have tried to stop teen pregnancy through campaigns
about safe sex or abstinence; they have tried to scare teens with posters
and television ads portraying the horrors of early parenthood; they have
done everything short of assigning personal chaperones to every

238. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2006).
239. See ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 35-36.
240. Bill Albert, New Federal Investment in Preventing Teen Pregnancy Applauded, NAT'L
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.thenational

campaign.org/media/press-release.aspx?releaselD=198.
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individual teenager in the United States to keep kids from having sex
and getting pregnant. Unfortunately, the level of dedication, financial
resources, and passion reserved for stopping the social ill of teen
pregnancy dies a sudden death when a teen actually gets pregnant. Once
she becomes pregnant, it appears that society wants nothing to do with
her.
There is a dearth of attention paid to pregnant teens generally, and
particularly there is little information about what it is like for pregnant
teens to pursue their education after they become pregnant. Until July
2010, there had never been a bill introduced in Congress that addressed
retaining pregnant students in school. 24 1 The most prominent national
organizations that deal with the issue of teen pregnancy focus almost
solely on prevention. 2 4 2 Few resources are dedicated to ensuring that the
pregnant or parenting student herself is successful, and once she
becomes pregnant, resources are focused on her fetus or child, as though
the young parent is already a lost cause.243
The most common tool employed by organizations that are
dedicated to preventing teen pregnancy is to quote statistics about the
terrible things that are more likely to happen to pregnant teens.244 High
dropout rates, high rates of unemployment, a higher demand for welfare
benefits, high multiple birth rate-and the list goes on-show teens how
terrible it would be if they became pregnant. 2 4 5 Ironically, despite the
sobering impact of those numbers, there is little, if any, effort by those
organizations or any others on a national level to address the problem
241. Pregnant and Parenting Students Access to Education Act of 2010, H.R. 5893, 11Ith
Cong. (2010). Representative Jared Polis introduced this act on July 28, 2010, which incentivizes,
with federal grant money, schools to retain pregnant and parenting students. Id.
242. The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy (the "Campaign") and
Stay Teen are two of the more prominent organizations that show up in a Google search for "teen
pregnancy."

See
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TEEN

&

UNPLANNED

PREGNANCY,

http://www.thenationalcampaign.org
(last
visited
Feb.
18,
2011);
STAYTEEN.ORG,
http://www.stayteen.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). Since 2002, the Campaign has organized a
National Day to Prevent Teen Pregnancy. On May 5, 2010, they linked with StayTeen.org to deliver
messages to teens about the negative consequences of teen pregnancy. See The National Day to
Prevent Teen Pregnancy, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY,

http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/nationall (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
243. Telephone Interview with Benita Miller, Founder and Exec. Dir., The Brooklyn Young
Mother's Collective (July 15, 2010). Ms. Miller highlighted the problem by sharing an anecdote
about a city-run program that was conducting an outreach session for young mothers and mothersto-be about their babies' nutritional needs, which was scheduled on a weekday, during school hours.
Id; see also Interview with Benita Miller: Attorney and Executive Director at The Brooklyn Young
Mother's Collective, THE DAILY FEMME! (June 21, 2010), http://media.causes.com/ribbon/840089.
244. See Preventing Unplannedand Teen Pregnancy: Why It Matters, THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN
TO

PREVENT TEEN &

UNPLANNED

PREGNANCY,

http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/about-

us/wim.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
245. See id.
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once it has happened. Once a teen actually becomes pregnant, she is left
to herself to confront and navigate the rocky waters of teen pregnancy.
One reason for this about-face might be rooted in a fear that providing
help to pregnant students might positively reinforce their "bad behavior"
of getting pregnant in the first place.
Teen pregnancy in American society has been treated as a source of
extreme shame for families and individuals affected by it. 24 6 Despite the
many possible explanations for a teen becoming pregnant, including
rape, incest, and sexual coercion, the common assumption was and is
that the pregnancy is the result of a character flaw in the pregnant girl
and should be negatively reinforced.247 The fear appears to have
manifested itself into a belief that providing support, or even
acknowledgment, of the pregnancy might be viewed as an invitation to
other teens to follow suit. 2 48 But even if this is not a reason that many
people and institutions in American society ignore pregnant teens, the
resulting disconnect between the understanding that teen pregnancy
causes many, sometimes lifelong, problems and the resounding silence
in the face of the problem once it has happened is a travesty that must be
addressed. Unfortunately, these negative attitudes about the pregnant
individuals themselves keep the teen pregnancy conversation focused
almost exclusively on prevention and have stood in the way of opening a
conversation about how to stop pregnancy discrimination in schools.
B.

Why a PregnancyDiscriminationAct to Title IXIs Necessary

When the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed, it opened the
door for women to sue employers or potential employers for
discrimination based on their pregnancy status. Before Geduldig clearly
signaled that federal courts would not hear Equal Protection pregnancy
discrimination cases in 1974, a Westlaw search for pregnancy
discrimination yielded thirty-six results. 24 9 After Geduldig, but before
the Supreme Court decided Gilbert, which barred claims for pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII, there were sixty cases reported. 2 50 After
246. WENDY LUTTRELL, PREGNANT BODIES, FERTILE MINDS: GENDER, RACE, AND THE
SCHOOLING OF PREGNANT TEENS 26-3 5 (2003).
247. See KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY 4,
17-24 (1996); LUTTRELL, supra note 246, at 27-28, 32-33.
248. LUKER, supra note 247, at 2; LUTTRELL, supranote 246, at 27, 32.
249. A Westlaw search performed on February 18, 2011 in the "ALLFEDS" database for
pregnancy discrimination cases before June 17, 1974 yielded thirty-six results. The search language
used was "pregnancy /s discrimination & da(bef 6/17/1974)."
250. This Westlaw search performed on February 18, 2011 was also in "ALLFEDS," and was
narrowed to the dates between June 17, 1974 (the date Geduldig was decided), and December 7,
1976 (the date Gilbert was decided). The search language used was "pregnancy /s discrimination &
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Gilbert barred such cases from being brought under Title VII, but before
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed, there were sixty-nine
cases reported on Westlaw. 25 1 After the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
was added to Title VII, there have been 2545 lawsuits reported on
Westlaw for pregnancy discrimination.252 Because thirty-two years have
passed since the Pregnancy Discrimination Act became law, the raw
numbers are not particularly telling. On average however, before the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, there were eleven pregnancy
discrimination cases reported per year, and after the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (which only allows Title VII cases, not Equal
Protection cases), there have been an average of 79.5 pregnancy
discrimination cases reported per year. These numbers indicate that until
Congress showed its clear intent to allow women to sue for pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII, women were not likely to seek to enforce
their rights in federal court.
In the Title IX context, the lawsuit can act as an effective stick to
encourage schools to comply with the law more readily, and an equally
effective carrot to encourage students to become their own rights
watchdogs. Both are necessary to protect students from pregnancy
discrimination in schools. Schools have little incentive to comply with
the Regulations at present, because unlawful behavior that might be
properly sanctioned will likely not result in sanctions if schools correct
their behavior quickly enough.253 This leaves students vulnerable to
discrimination until somebody takes a proactive role in seeking
enforcement. Unfortunately, being a proactive student in the face of
pregnancy discrimination is not a desirable position to take unless
Congress provides a carrot in the form of a clear private right of action
for monetary damages.
1. Litigation Makes Compliance with Federal Law More Likely
As stated in Part II.A. 1, supra, a pregnant student who is subjected
to discrimination in schools probably does not have a private right to sue
for that discrimination, and if, for some reason, a court did hear the case,
as stated in Part II.A.2, supra, she also would not be able to recover
da(aft 6/17/1974 & bef 12/7/1976)."
251. Another "ALLFEDS" search was performed on February 18, 2011 for cases reported
between December 7, 1974 (the date Gilbert was decided) and October 31, 1978 (the date the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed). The search language used was "pregnancy /s
discrimination & da(aft 12/7/1976 & bef 10/31/1978)."
252. This "ALLFEDS" search was performed on February 18, 2011 for cases reported after
October 31, 1978. The search language used was "pregnancy /s discrimination & da(aft
10/31/1978)."
253. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
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monetary damages for the harm she suffered. The Regulations require
that schools governed by Title IX take whatever remedial action deemed
necessary by the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights of the DOE when
there has been a determination that the school discriminated against an
individual on the basis of sex.254 The remedy must be designed to
"overcome the effects of such discrimination." 2 55 If, for example, a
school wrongfully discharges a student because she is pregnant, it likely
will just readmit her and avoid monetary sanctions for the
discrimination. It is possible that the school would never lose any
funding for its behavior, but the student who was wrongfully expelled
from school could not recover for whatever damages she suffered as a
result of the delay in her education.
While there are obvious reasons that an individual would like to
receive monetary compensation for discrimination she suffered and the
financial harms that stemmed from it, there are also excellent reasons to
allow lawsuits as a disincentive to schools that discriminate. The
potential loss of federal funding is probably highly motivating to most
school administrators to comply with the law, but it does not have the
direct and efficient outcome that a lawsuit would have. First, it is
possible that longtime school discrimination could go unnoticed.
Second, the regulatory system allows schools to correct discriminatory
behavior without being sanctioned, creating little downside to behaving
unlawfully. 2 56 Turning to the first concern, the current compliance
system under the Regulations is reactive and unable to catch all of the
discrimination that could be happening.
There are basically three ways discrimination can come to light
under the current Regulations. First, a student can file an administrative
action with the DOE for discrimination, which could take years to
resolve.257 Second, if no student brings an action, the DOE can catch the
discrimination in an official review of the school's policies and

254. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2010).
255. Id.
256. See id. § 100.8(a). The procedural provisions in Title VI are incorporated by reference
into the Regulations. Id. § 106.71. The Title VI "procedure for effecting compliance" provides that
noncompliance with the law can result in a loss of federal funding, but only after other informal
means to correct the discrimination have failed. Id. § 100.8(a). Furthermore, an order to terminate
federal funds (or the denial of future federal funding applications) cannot be effective until three
things have happened: (1) the discriminating school has been notified of its transgression and given
an opportunity to voluntarily comply; (2) there has been an express finding, on the record and after
an opportunity for a hearing, that the school is out of compliance; and (3) the congressional
committees responsible for the oversight of the program involved have received a full written report
about the circumstances and grounds for the termination of funds. Id. § 100.8(c).
257. Id. § 100.7(b).
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procedures, which might rarely, if ever, happen.258 Third, the DOE could
catch wind of discrimination in the school's own self-reporting
materials, which likely will not reveal any nefarious activity. 25 9 The
indirect and inefficient nature of the processes through which a school's
discrimination can be caught create an atmosphere that allows continued
discrimination.
If discrimination is discovered, however, the procedural provisions
require that the offending program be permitted to voluntarily correct the
discrimination by "informal means."260 If a school agrees to remedy the
discrimination, there will be no funding sanction at all. 26 1 This is likely
true regardless of the number of times the school has been determined to
be out of compliance.26 2 While that outcome might seem fair to school
administrators and other students who might feel the pinch of attending a
school that has lost some or all of its federal funding, it creates little
incentive for schools to avoid discriminating in the first place, or even to
find out what discriminatory behavior they should avoid. A private right
of action that allows a student against whom a school has discriminated
to sue for monetary damages would not only make the student whole for
the harm she suffered, but would also be the stick that schools need to
discourage discrimination in the first place.
If Congress passed a Pregnancy Discrimination Act for Title IX, it
is possible that schools would seek to review their practices and curtail
any discriminatory behavior before the first lawsuit was filed. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that many schools operate in ignorance of the laws
that prohibit pregnancy discrimination.263 As a result, they may expel
students for being pregnant, send them to alternative schools against
their wishes, or neglect to provide them with the equal education to
which they are legally entitled. If schools had individuals inside their
walls every day who were empowered to enforce the law, they might
take the opportunity to get into, and stay in, compliance before the law
takes effect. Until then, schools are capable of discriminating without
having to worry much about any negative consequences, unless and until
they have been notified by the DOE that there might be a problem.

258. Id § 100.7(a).
259. Id §§ 100.6(b), 100.7(c).
260. Id. § 100.8(a).
261. Id. § 100.8(d).
262. See id.
263. Jeremy P. Meyer, Birth Leave Sought for Girls, DENV. POST, Jan. 7, 2008,
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_7899096. The article discussed a request by students to the
school board that the current policy in some Denver-area schools to count all absences after the
birth of a student's baby as unexcused be changed. Id.
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The Regulations prohibit schools from expelling students for being
pregnant.2 64 Before the Regulations took effect, it was not uncommon
for schools to expel pregnant students, despite their marital status, when
their pregnancy became known.26 5 Since the Regulations took effect, it
has been difficult to say if, or how many, schools are expelling students
because they are pregnant. This lack of data is compounded by a lack of
evidence regarding school compliance in this area. As discussed in Part
II.D.3, supra, there are three federal cases (two reported) where an
individual has brought a pregnancy discrimination action against a
school. In addition, the outcome of an enforcement action by the Office
of Civil Rights of the DOE, the government entity responsible for
enforcing the Regulations, is not publicly available without a Freedom
266
of Information Act request.
But the harm of being expelled because of pregnancy, even without
empirical data proving that the practice is rampant, outweighs the risk of
legislating a fix to a non-problem. The more likely problem, however, in
today's culture, is that school districts may, perhaps even inadvertently,
encourage or force pregnant students into alternative schools despite the
prohibition on that practice in the Regulations.267 In the face of a
Pregnancy Discrimination Act that makes it clear that Title IX itself also
prohibits forced, coerced, or even encouraged segregation of pregnant
students, schools might hesitate before engaging in any of those
practices. And if Congress clearly approved a private right of action for
violations of this Regulation, even school administrators who are
ignorant of the prohibition now might be alerted, through litigation in
other school districts or via media attention, to the change. Educating
school administrators on the requirements of a newly enacted Pregnancy
Discrimination Act amendment to Title IX might also encourage them to
review the comparability of alternative programs as well.
The last Regulation that should be incorporated into a Title IX
Pregnancy Discrimination Act is the requirement that alternative schools
available to students must be comparable to their mainstream
counterparts. In one of the rare cases where plaintiffs accessed a federal
court for a violation of the Regulations, the court denied a motion for
summary judgment from the defendant school district on this issue.268
264. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1).
265. See LUKER, supra note 247, at 62.
266. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
267. See Kicklighter v. Evans Cnty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 714 & n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1997)
(stating facts regarding a school secretary's encouragement of a pregnant student to consider, given
her "condition," attending an alternative school for "'disruptive.' students).
268. Cecilia G. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., No. CV 04-7275, slip op. at 26
(C.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
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2. A Private Right of Action for Monetary Damages Might Be an
Incentive for Victims of Discrimination to Seek Enforcement,
Even when DOE Cannot or Will Not Intervene
Even if some courts determined that Title IX does prohibit
pregnancy discrimination and decided to allow students to sue, because
it is clear that courts are not required to hear such cases, there would
likely continue to be little to no school pregnancy discrimination
litigation. There are many reasons a pregnant student might refrain from
suing for pregnancy discrimination in schools. First, the likelihood of
resolution of the lawsuit before she is scheduled to graduate is slim.
Second, she probably has a lot of other things to worry about, and
fighting for her right to an education might not top the list. Third, and
most importantly here, she probably recognizes that there is little upside
for her if she sues.
While it may be a moral victory for students to successfully enforce
the Regulations and force a school into compliance, the victory could be
hollow if there are no monetary incentives for her to sue. Right now, a
student making a complaint may be able to get injunctive relief, allowing
her back into school for wrongful expulsion, permitting her to attend her
mainstream school if she so chooses, or requiring a school district to
equalize an alternative school with the mainstream school.2 69 But
enforcement actions seeking this relief take time, which would often
likely stretch beyond the length of her pregnancy. 27 0 The loss of the
months that she was forced out of school or into an inferior program
cannot be regained, even if she wins her action. In the alternative, if she
wins and the school does not comply with the order in her favor, the
school loses its federal funding and she gains nothing.
This system, as stated in Part III.B.1, supra, might scare some
schools into compliance, but in order for it to work, someone must take
the initiative to file a complaint. The Office of Civil Rights of the DOE
can take this initiative after an unfavorable compliance review, but that

269. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1)-(3).
270. See Anthony R. Pileggi, An Attorney's Guide to Courthouse Practice and Procedure:
Civil Division Districtof Columbia Superior Court 1983, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1063, 1079 (1983)
("The average time between reaching issue and trial [in the civil division of the District of Columbia
Superior Court] is fourteen months for jury trials and nonjury trials over $10,000, and six months
for non-jury trials under $10,000."); see also Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws
Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 991, 1023-24 (1996) (stating that, "[o]n average, it took the [New York City
Human Rights] Commission seventeen months to close housing discrimination cases filed in 1992
and 1993" and "when a remedy is not provided within weeks, it is likely that the complainant will
no longer be interested in injunctive relief several months or, in some cases, years later" and thus
"justice delayed may very well be justice denied").
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assumes that discriminatory behavior is open and notorious enough to be
caught. The most efficient form of enforcement is to encourage young
women who have suffered discrimination to become "civilian
compliance officers," by allowing them to sue for monetary damages.
This more direct approach could fill gaps in ensuring compliance that
may exist under the current scheme that relies on the Office of Civil
Rights to take the initiative of enforcement. It would also be a step closer
to making students who have been unlawfully treated by their schools
whole.
C. A PrivateRight ofAction for Monetary Damages Deals More
Effectively with the Reality of the Social Problems that Often Accompany
Teen Pregnancy
Plenty of data is available about what terrible things happen to
many young women when they become pregnant early in life.271 Popular
statistics about the social problems that accompany teen pregnancy
include high dropout rates among teen parents, poor or nonexistent
prenatal care, and high rates of multiple unplanned early pregnancies are
frequently cited.272 There are also alarming statistics about the babies
born to teen parents-they struggle more in school, are more likely to
become pregnant as teens or end up in jail, and are more likely to live in
impoverished homes.273 A simple Google search for "preventing teen
pregnancy" brings many sources that list the scary statistics and social
ills that are likely to befall someone who becomes pregnant in her teens.
Ironically, however, once a teen becomes pregnant, the reality of those
statistics seems to have done nothing to encourage society to be more
proactive about protecting a teen's right to education during her
pregnancy.27 4
The possibility that an ignorant or discriminatory school
administration could eject a pregnant student from school with minimal
or no repercussions should be offensive to an advanced society. School
is probably the best and most efficient place for teens to get help when

271. See Stay Informed: Teen Pregnancy, STAYTEEN.ORG, http://www.stayeen.org/teenpregnancy (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
272. See Options for Pregnant Teens, LIVESTRONG.COM, http://www.1ivestrong.com/article/
125702-options-pregnant-teens/ (last updated May 18, 2010); Stay Informed: Teen Pregnancy,
supranote 271.
273. See Preventing Unplanned and Teen Pregnancy: Why It Matters, supra note 244; Stay
Informed: Teen Pregnancy,supra note 271.
274. See Priscilla Pardini, A Supportive Place for Teen Parents, RETHINKING SCH. (Summer
2003), http://www.rethinkingschools.org/sex/teenl74.shtml ("[T]here is still a stigma to being a
pregnant teen.... The prevailing opinion is, 'You've made your bed, and you ought to lie in it."').
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they find themselves facing the challenges an early pregnancy brings.275
Instead of treating her as a taint on the school population, schools should
embrace pregnant students as among those who need them the most.
Schools, instead of pushing the "problem" pregnant student out, could
minimize the chances that she will struggle with poverty, poor prenatal
care, and multiple pregnancies. Educating and treating the current
generation of pregnant students effectively could also set the stage for
dropping future teen pregnancy rates by helping create contributing
members of society who raise contributing members of society. Those
babies born to students who did not drop out of school, who got their
college degrees, who achieved careers may be less likely to become
pregnant as teens or land in jail. 276
The law should make it easier for pregnant students who have
suffered discrimination to hold schools accountable when they are
unlawfully expelled. The law should also make it clear that inferior
education at alternative schools will not be tolerated. Schools that accept
the challenge of educating pregnant and parenting students boast much
better graduation rates than even the mainstream schools in the same
school district. 2 7 7 But all too often, alternative schools for pregnant
students are inadequate to properly educate them.278 The risk that
pregnant students could be funneled, sometimes against their wishes,
into inferior schools is another illustration of why Title IX should
include language creating a private right of action to sue for monetary
damages for violations of the Regulations.

275. See id
276. See Options for Pregnant Teens, supra note 272; Stay Informed. Teen Pregnancy,supra
note 271.
277. See Pardini,supra note 274. At Lady Pitts High School, an alternative school for pregnant
and parenting teens in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the graduation rate is fifty-six out of sixty students,
which significantly outpaces the Milwaukee graduation rate. Id. And only ten percent of the young
women who have attended Lady Pitts have had become pregnant again, which is much lower than
the national average. Id.
278. See Julie Bosman, Schools for Pregnant Girls, Relic of 1960s New York, Will Close, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2007, at Al.
A dozen girls, some perched awkwardly with their pregnant bellies flush against the
desks, were struggling over a high school geometry assignment on a recent afternoon.
No pencils, no textbooks, no Pythagorean theorem. Instead, they sewed quilts....
. . . "It ties into geometry," said Patricia Martin, the principal. "They're cutting shapes."
Id. New York City has since closed the Program for Pregnant Students schools, citing poor test
scores, attendance, and facilities. Id.
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IX PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT SHOULD
SAY

The language that should be added to Title IX cannot be identical to
the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in Title VII. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed specifically to address the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert, which stated that provisions
excluding pregnancy from insurance coverage offered by a company to
its employees were not considered discrimination based on sex. 279 The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not mince words when clarifying that
pregnancy discrimination is unlawful under Title VII: "The terms
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions ... .,,280 The language that should be amended to Title IX
should similarly take into account Supreme Court precedent that
excludes pregnancy from forms of discrimination barred by Title IX. As
such, the language should be aimed at closing the gap allowing
pregnancy discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause in Geduldig
and addressing the denial in Sandoval of private rights of action for
regulations that do not "authoritatively construe" the statutory text.
As stated in Part II.B.1, supra, the Supreme Court has ruled that
discrimination based on pregnancy status is not discrimination based on
sex, which is generally barred under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court has also ruled that regulations to statutes do not carry
with them a private right of action to sue for discrimination barred by
those regulations, unless they "authoritatively construe" the statute,
meaning that the regulations are simply giving force and effect to the
statutory text itself.281 Because of the Geduldig decision excluding
pregnancy discrimination from Equal Protection Clause scrutiny against
discrimination based on sex, it is entirely likely that a court would
interpret Sandoval to mean that the Regulations, which bar pregnancy
discrimination, do not authoritatively construe the language of Title IX
that bars federally funded education providers from discrimination "on
the basis of sex." 2 82 It would be easy for a court to say that the
Regulations are in no way authoritatively construing the statutory text of
Title IX because Geduldig makes clear that pregnancy discrimination is
not "on the basis of sex." 283 The best way for Congress to combat such a

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
See, e.g., supra notes 77-79, 84-85 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
See supraPart II.B.1.
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result is through an amendment to Title IX to address specifically the
language in Supreme Court precedent that creates the gap that leaves
pregnant students vulnerable.
The language of an amendment to Title IX clearly barring
pregnancy discrimination should also include a provision allowing
plaintiffs to seek and receive monetary damages. As stated in Part
III.B.2, supra, monetary damages are an efficient and effective tool to
discourage discrimination. Allowing pregnant students to sue for
declaratory or injunctive relief may not rectify the harms suffered when
a student is denied access to an adequate education, even if the relief is
granted as quickly as possible. The possibility of losing monetary
damages will not only discourage schools from discriminating in the first
place, but the possibility of receiving monetary damages should rectify
the harm that the pregnant student suffered as a result of the
discrimination. The most effective tool to help pregnant students fight
for equal access to education would be an amendment to Title IX that
negates the precedent that stands in the way of a pregnant student's
ability to advocate for herself and prevents monetary damages from
being available to her.
Congress does not need to reinvent the wheel when drafting antipregnancy discrimination language for Title IX, and should borrow from
Title VII to start. The language should address the negative Supreme
Court precedent and address the availability of monetary damages as a
remedy. Title IX should be amended to add, in the appropriate location,
the following language:
The term "on the basis of sex" includes, but is not limited to, on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. The
regulations to this section regarding pregnancy and parenting status [34
C.F.R. § 106.40] should be read to authoritatively construe the statute.
As such, a private right of action for discrimination based on
pregnancy or parenting status is contemplated by the statute. Plaintiffs
are eligible to receive monetary damages for discrimination barred
under this Title.

V.

CONCLUSION

Congress recognized, almost forty years ago, when it passed Title
LX, that providing equal access to education for girls is crucial to a
functioning, just, and advancing society. What impact that understanding
would have on schools, students, administrators, and teachers, became
clearer when the Regulations were passed a few years later.
Unfortunately, because the processes through which legislation and
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regulations are passed are dependent on separate constitutionally-granted
powers, and because the Supreme Court has further muddied the waters,
it is unclear whether education access is a right pregnant students can
fight for. It is time that Congress officially grant pregnant students the
most effective and efficient weapon available to those seeking to
vindicate their rights-the lawsuit. Congress should amend Title IX to
clearly bar pregnancy discrimination and allow students who have
suffered discrimination the right to sue for damages to rectify their
harms.
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